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FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
INTRODUCTION
The Tenth Circuit recently decided several cases having a signifi-
cant impact on federal and tribal authority over matters occurring in In-
dian country.' Delineating the lines of authority between the federal gov-
ernment, the states, and the Indian tribes is an historically contentious
process. Persistent fluctuations in United States policy towards Native
Americans provide a constant source of disputes over jurisdiction in In-
dian country. A brief outline of the history of United States policy will
set the stage for a discussion of recent Tenth Circuit decisions regarding
the definition of "dependent Indian community," the tribal court exhaus-
tion doctrine, and treating tribes as states under the Clean Water Act.
American Indian tribes existed as self-governing, independent so-
cieties long before the arrival of Europeans, who recognized them as
sovereign nations from the beginning of the colonial period.2 While tribal
sovereignty survived the formation of the United States, the tribes came
to occupy a unique position in American society. Dubbed "domestic de-
pendent nations,"3 American Indians maintain a trust relationship with
the United States similar to that of a "ward to his guardian.'" The nature
of this unique arrangement gives the federal government plenary and
exclusive power over Native Americans.! The exercise of this power is
limited only by notions of a fiduciary responsibility that stems from the
trust relationship.'
Following the colonial period, western expansion and settlement by
non-Indians gave birth to a policy of removal where the tribes were
forced from their ancestral homelands, relocated west of the Mississippi,
and eventually restricted to specific reservations.! Then, in 1887, Con-
1. "While the public is probably most familiar with the term Indian reservation, for most
jurisdictional purposes the governing legal term is 'Indian country."' FELIX S. COHEN, FELIX S.
COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 27 (Rennard Strickland et al. eds., 1982). This
survey of federal Indian law covers cases decided between September 1996 and August 1997.
2. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 542-43 (1832); Angela R. Hoeft, Coming
Full Circle: American Indian Treaty Litigation from an International Human Rights Perspective, 14
LAW & INEQ. J. 203, 209-11 (1995).
3. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
4. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17. The Court remarked that "[tihe condition of the Indians in
relation to the United States is perhaps unlike that of any other two people in existence." Id. at 16.
5. See Worcester, 31 U.S. at 557-61; see also United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323
(1978) ("[Tribal sovereignty] exists only at the sufferance of Congress and is subject to complete
defeasance.").
6. See COHEN, supra note 1, at 221 ("[T1he trust relationship is one of the primary corner-
stones of Indian law."). For a discussion on the trust responsibility see STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE
RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES 26-36 (Norman Dorson ed., 2d ed. 1992).
7. See Ralph W. Johnson, Indian Tribes and the Legal System, 72 WASH. L. REV. 1021,
1022-23 (1997).
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gress passed the Indian General Allotment Act8 which authorized the
distribution of reservation lands to individual Indians in an effort to de-
stroy tribal authority and assimilate Native Americans into white
society.9 Proponents of the Act naively assumed that Native Americans
would shed centuries of cultural heritage, cultivate the land, prosper, and
join mainstream America."°
To accommodate settlers in the West, the Allotment Act also pro-
vided for the sale of surplus reservation lands to non-Indians." This sale
of surplus lands resulted in a checkerboard effect with respect to land
within the reservations, and contributed to the monumental decline in the
amount of reservation lands in the United States.'2 The misguided policy
of assimilation ended in 1934 with the passage of the Indian Reorganiza-
tion Act,'" which promoted tribal existence and attempted to restore tribal
ownership of unoccupied surplus lands lost during the allotment period."
In the 1950s, Congress abruptly adopted a policy of termination, at-
tempting to end the protective status of Native Americans and destroy
tribal communities.'" The Termination Era ended roughly a decade after
it began,'6 and since the 1960s, Congress has slowly constructed its cur-
rent policy of supporting tribal self-determination and self-governance
with the understanding that tribal communities are here to stay.'7
8. See Indian General Allotment (Dawes) Act, ch. 119, §§ 1-11, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (current
version at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-358 (1994 & Supp. 1996)).
9. See Johnson, supra note 7, at 1024; see also Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment,
27 ARiz. ST. L.J. 1, 9 (1995) (noting that "[a]ssimilation was viewed as both humanitarian and
inevitable"). Originally, all allotted lands were to be held for the individual Indians in trust by the
federal government for a period of 25 years, after which the individual would receive the land in fee.
See id. at 10. Once held in fee, the land would be fully alienable, and the holder of the land would be
subject to state civil and criminal law. See id. Subsequent amendments to the Act provided mecha-
nisms for the direct distribution of reservation land in fee to "competent" individual Indians, thereby
accelerating the destruction of the reservations. See id. at 10-11.
10. See PEVAR, supra note 6, at 5; see also Royster, supra note 9, at 10.
I1. See Royster, supra note 9, at 13.
12. See PEVAR, supra note 6, at 5; see also Johnson, supra note 7, at 1025 (noting a decline in
Indian-held land from 138 million acres in 1887 to 48 million in 1934).
13. Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), ch. 576, §§ 1-19, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (current version at
25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1994 & Supp. II 1996)).
14. See PEVAR, supra note 6, at 6. "Indian tribes were encouraged to adopt their own constitu-
tions, to become federally chartered corporations, and to assert their inherent powers of local self-
government." Id.
15. See id. at 57; see also COHEN, supra note 1, at 152 (noting that official United States
policy was the destruction of tribal governments and the termination of the unique tribal-federal trust
relationship). Congress also passed Public Law 280 during this period. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch.
505, Pub. L. No. 280, § 2, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1161-1162 (1994)).
This Act extended state civil and criminal jurisdiction into Indian country in five specified states;
Alaska was added in 1958. See COHEN, supra note 1, at 362.
16. See COHEN, supra note 1, at 180.
17. See Hoeft, supra note 2, at 217-18; see also COHEN, supra note 1, at 185. Two important
pieces of legislation signified the shift in U.S. policy, the Indian Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 90-
284, 82 Stat. 77 (1968) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341 (1994 & Supp. 11 1996)), and the Indian
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I. DEFINING "DEPENDENT INDIAN COMMUNITY"
A. Background
Federal criminal jurisdiction in Indian country is mostly governed
by two statutes." The General Crimes Act provides federal jurisdiction
over interracial crimes,'9 and the Major Crimes Act confers federal juris-
diction over sixteen specified crimes committed by Indians against other
Indians.' Tribal governments maintain concurrent jurisdiction over non-
major crimes committed by tribal members, but do not have jurisdiction
over non-Indian criminal defendants regardless of the location of the
crime.2
Self-Determination Act, Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2206 (1975) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 450a-
450n (1994)).
18. See COHEN, supra note 1, at 286.
19. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1994). The statute reads:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general laws of the United States
as to the punishment of offenses committed in any place within the sole and exclusive ju-
risdiction of the United States, except the District of Columbia, shall extend to the Indian
country.
This section shall not extend to offenses committed by one Indian against the person
or property of another Indian, nor to any Indian committing any offense in the Indian
country who has been punished by the local law of the tribe, or to any case where, by
treaty stipulations, the exclusive jurisdiction over such offenses is or may be secured to
the Indian tribes respectively.
Id. State law is assimilated into federal proceedings as a gap filling device when there is no applica-
ble federal substantive criminal law. See 18 U.S.C. § 1153(b) (1994).
20. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1994). The Major Crimes Act currently reads:
(a) Any Indian who commits against the person or property of another Indian or
other person any of the following offenses, namely, murder, manslaughter, kidnapping,
maiming, a felony under chapter 109A, incest, assault with intent to commit murder, as-
sault with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting serious bodily injury (as defined in sec-
tion 1365 of this title), an assault against an individual who has not attained the age of 16
years, arson, burglary, robbery, and a felony under section 661 of this title within the In-
dian country, shall be subject to the same law and penalties as all other persons commit-
ting any of the above offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.
(b) Any offense referred to in subsection (a) of this section that is not defined and
punished by Federal law in force within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States
shall be defined and punished in accordance with the laws of the State in which such of-
fense was committed as are in force at the time of such offense.
Id.; see also Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 203 n.14 (1977) (noting that some
courts of appeals have read the Act to confer exclusive jurisdiction on the federal govemment, but
not deciding the issue). The Major Crimes Act applies only when the perpetrator and victim of the
crime are Indian; it remains unsettled whether the Act divests tribal courts of concurrent jurisdiction.
See Frank Pommersheim, The Crucible of Sovereignty: Analyzing Issues of Tribal Jurisdiction, 31
ARIz. L. REV. 329, 332 (1989). A significant exception to federal jurisdiction under the Major
Crimes Act is found in 18 U.S.C. § 1162, which provides for state jurisdiction over offenses com-
mitted by or against Indians in Indian country in a limited number of states and territories. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1162. See also sources cited supra note 15.
21. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 195. The Supreme Court rejected the Suquamish Tribe's asser-
tion of such jurisdiction which the tribe based on retained national sovereignty and inherent jurisdic-
tion to try and punish non-Indians. Id. at 212.
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The Major Crimes Act governs only those offenses occurring in
Indian country where both the victim and the perpetrator are Indian.' If
an offense occurs outside Indian country, the federal government is
without jurisdiction under the Act.' Indian country, as defined in 18
U.S.C. § 1151, consists of three types of lands: reservations, dependent
Indian communities, and Indian allotments. ' The term "dependent Indian
community" represents congressional recognition of two Supreme Court
decisions, United States v. Sandoval' and United States v. McGowan."
In Sandoval, the Court considered whether the federal government
could maintain a criminal prosecution for "introducing intoxicating liq-
uor into the Indian country" where the area in question consisted of about
twenty scattered Indian pueblos. 2 The Indians owned the land commun-
ally in fee, originally under grants from the King of Spain which Con-
gress subsequently confirmed.' The federal government provided agents
and superintendents to guard the interests of the Indians, established
schools, and constructed dams and irrigation works on the pueblo lands.'
The Court found that because the federal government treated the pueblos
as "dependent communities," federal jurisdiction over the area was ap-
propriate.'
22. The Major Crimes Act was passed in the late 1800s in response to the Supreme Court
decision in Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883). Crow Dog was a Brule Sioux who murdered
another Indian of the same nation in Indian country. Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 557. He was prosecuted
in federal court, found guilty and sentenced to death. Id. The Supreme Court held that in the absence
of "a clear expression of the intention of Congress," the federal courts were without jurisdiction over
such criminal incidents. Id. at 572. This ruling prompted a displeased Congress to pass the Major
Crimes Act, listing seven specified major crimes over which the federal courts would exercise juris-
diction. See Appropriations Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (1885); see also
COHEN supra note 1, at 300. This action has been described as a "major blow at the integrity of the
Indian tribes." FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN CRISIS 334 (1976). The Su-
preme Court justified the congressional intrusion into Indian affairs by noting the dependent status of
the tribes as wards of the federal government. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-84
(1886).
23. See 18 U.S.C. § 1153.
24. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994). The section states in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise provided ... the term "Indian country" ... means (a) all land
within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States
Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way
running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders
of the United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory
thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments,
the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running
through the same.
Id.
25. 231 U.S. 28 (1913).
26. 302 U.S. 535 (1938).
27. Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 38-39.
28. Id. at 39.
29. Id. at 39-40.
30. Id. at 47-48.
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McGowan also concerned a federal prohibition on the introduction
of intoxicants into Indian country."' In McGowan, however, the land in
question had been purchased and held by the federal government for the
benefit of needy Indians who were scattered across the state of Nevada."
The Court found that because the federal government had purchased and
held the land for the benefit of a "dependent people," federal jurisdiction
over the area was appropriate."
While neither of these cases involved reservations, "the dependency
of the Indians on the government ... was sufficiently similar to the de-
pendency of reservation Indians to include those areas within the mean-
ing of the term Indian country."' The 1948 statutory codification of these
cases, 18 U.S.C. § 1151, allowed for the first time the application of the
federal criminal code to strictly Indian crimes occurring off-reservation."
Since then, courts have struggled to create a workable definition of de-
pendent Indian community that would adequately address the complex
nature of the federal-tribal relationship. The definition carries tremen-
dous significance because section 1151 has become the baseline for not
only criminal, but civil jurisdiction in Indian country as well.3
Until early 1998, the Supreme Court had eschewed formulating any
definitive test for dependent status, preferring instead to frame the issue
as "whether the area has been 'validly set apart for the use of the Indians
as such, under the superintendence of the [federal] Government.'
Without Supreme Court guidance, the circuit courts developed various
multi-factor tests to deal with the issue. The Tenth Circuit formed its
approach to the dependent status issue over a series of cases. In United
States v. Martine,"8 the Tenth Circuit adopted a three factor analysis con-
31. McGowan, 302 U.S. at 536.
32. Id. at 536-37.
33. Id. at 538-39.
34. United States v. Adair, 913 F. Supp. 1503, 1509 (E.D. Okla. 1995).
35. SeeCOHEN, supra note 1,at 301 n.153.
36. See DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.2 (1974) ("While § 1151 is
concerned, on its face, only with criminal jurisdiction, the Court has recognized that it generally
applies as well to questions of civil jurisdiction."); see also Indian Country U.S.A. v. Oklahoma Tax
Comm'n, 829 F.2d 967, 973 (10th Cir. 1987) ("[T]he Indian country classification is the benchmark
for approaching the allocation of federal, tribal, and state authority with respect to Indians and Indian
lands.").
37. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 598 U.S. 505, 511
(1991) (quoting United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535, 539 (1938)). In February of 1998, the
Supreme Court set out a definitive test for dependent community status that may render moot much
of the discussion in this section of the survey. See Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't,
118 S. Ct. 948 (1998) (Venetie 11). The Court held that dependent Indian community "refers to a
limited category of Indian lands that are neither reservations nor allotments, and that satisfy two
requirements-first, they must have been set aside by the Federal Government for the use of the
Indians as Indian land; second, they must be under federal superintendence." Venetie II, 118 S. Ct. at
953. A few thoughts concerning the effect of this holding on future questions of dependent commu-
nity status will follow the discussion of circuit decisions. See infra notes 91-97 and accompanying
text.
38. 442 F.2d 1022 (1Oth Cir. 1971).
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sidering "the nature of the area in question, the relationship of the in-
habitants of the area to Indian tribes and the federal government, and the
established practice of government agencies toward the area.' 9
Subsequently, the Eighth Circuit outlined a four-factor analysis in
United States v. South Dakota." In addition to the Martine factors, the
court considered whether the United States retains title to the lands and
authority to enact protective laws, whether there is an element of cohe-
siveness in the area, and whether the "lands have been set apart for the
use, occupancy and protection of dependent Indian peoples.""' The South
Dakota court determined that a housing project constituted a dependent
Indian community for several reasons: the federal government held title
to the land in trust for the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe, the govern-
ment provided financing for the construction of the project, the over-
whelming majority of inhabitants were Indian, and the Board of Com-
missioners of the Housing Authority were appointed by the Tribal Coun-
cil. 2 The finding of dependent status meant that the federal government,
and not the state of South Dakota, had jurisdiction over the project."
In Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Mining Co. v Watchman," the Tenth
Circuit further refined its dependent status analysis. In Watchman, the
district court ruled that a specific mine site did not constitute a dependent
Indian community. ' The Navajo Nation challenged the district court's
choice of the mine site as the proper area on which to focus its analysis,
arguing that the surrounding community should have been used instead."
In a case of first impression, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the district
court should not have focused its analysis on the mine site in isolation
from the surrounding area.'7 To guide the district court on remand, the
court established a two-step analysis for evaluating assertions of juris-
diction based on dependent Indian community status. ' The first step in-
volves a threshold determination of whether the area in question may
appropriately serve as a "community of reference." ' This determination
entails two analytical subparts, consideration of "the status of the area in
question as a community" and consideration of that "community of ref-
39. Martine, 442 F.2d at 1023.
40. 665 F.2d 837, 838 (8th Cir. 1981).
41. South Dakota, 665 F.2d at 838.
42. Id. at 839-43.
43. Id. at 837-38.
44. 52 F.3d 1531 (10th Cir. 1995) (involving a question of civil jurisdiction).
45. Id. at 1535.
46. Id. at 1536.
47. Id. at 1542-43. The state raised the proper community of reference issue on appeal in
South Dakota, but the Eighth Circuit avoided the the issue because it had not been raised at trial.
South Dakota, 665 F.2d at 841-42.
48. Watchman, 52 F.3d at 1542-45.
49. Id. at 1542-43.
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erence within the context of the surrounding area." After establishing
the proper community of reference, a court moves to the second step of
the Watchman test and applies the South Dakota factors to the chosen
community of reference." As outlined by the court, those factors include:
(1) whether the United States has retained "title to the lands which it
permits the Indians to occupy" and "authority to enact regulations and
protective laws respecting this territory"; (2) "the nature of the area in
question, the relationship of the inhabitants in the area to Indian tribes
and to the federal government, and the established practice of federal
government agencies toward the area"; (3) whether there is "an ele-
ment of cohesiveness ... manifested either by economic pursuits in
the area, common interests, or needs of the inhabitants as supplied by
that locality"; and (4) "whether such lands have been set aside for the
use, occupancy and protection of Indian peoples.' 2
B. United States v. Adair"
1. Facts
In United States v. Adair, the Tenth Circuit applied the Watchman
standard to an assertion of federal jurisdiction over a Cherokee defendant
charged with aggravated sexual abuse committed against another
Indian.' The offense took place in a Mutual Help Home built by the
Cherokee Nation Housing Authority (CNHA), a Cherokee Nation-
controlled Oklahoma state agency." The CNHA home was located in a
rural area of eastern Oklahoma known as "Rocky Mountain," which at
one time consisted mainly of restricted Indian allotments.' The passage
of time resulted in removal of restrictions from a majority of the allot-
ments, and thus Indians and non-Indians held most of the land restric-
tion-free. 7 Rocky Mountain's population was approximately one-half
Cherokee, but its geographical boundaries were uncertain. 8 No tribal or
local government existed, and aside from a small convenience store,
50. Id. at 1543-44,
51. Id.at1545-46.
52. Id. at 1545 (quoting and adopting the rule from United States v. South Dakota, 665 F.2d
837 (8th Cir. 1981)). The Watchman court remanded the issue of dependent community status to the
district court. Id. at 1546.
53. 111 F.3d 770 (10th Cir. 1997).
54. Adair, Ill F.3d at 772. The defendant was charged with four counts of sexual abuse in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a). Id. The government premised jurisdiction on 18 U.S.C. § 1153. Id.
55. Id. at 772.
56. Id. at 773. The allotments in question resulted from the forced migration of Indians from
the southeastern United States. Id. The defendant's family originally acquired the land on which the
CNHA home sits as a restricted allotment, but then conveyed it to the CNHA so that the home could
be built. Id. at 772. For a discussion of Indian allotments, see supra notes 8-12 and accompanying
text.
57. Adair, Ill F.3d at 773.
58. Id.
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there were no established businesses in the area.' The federal govern-
ment provided a number of social services including an Indian Health
Service nutrition program, a Bureau of Indian Affairs substance abuse
program, and Head Start.'
The federal government contended that Rocky Mountain was a de-
pendent Indian community and therefore considered Indian country un-
der 18 U.S.C. § 1151." The district court disagreed and dismissed the
case for lack of jurisdiction, stating that the area failed to constitute an
appropriate community of reference for dependent Indian community
analysis. 2
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court decision, finding that
Rocky Mountain was not a community and thus could not serve as a
community of reference for testing the presence of a dependent Indian
community.' Focusing on the lack of specific boundaries, the court of
appeals noted that consideration of the four factors of Watchman's sec-
ond step would become problematic." According to the court, Rocky
Mountain did not satisfy the Watchman definition of community because
the area exhibited a paucity of institutions and services, and displayed a
general dependency on surrounding areas for its economic vitality.'
Despite finding that Rocky Mountain failed the threshold test, the
court applied the four factors of the second step of Watchman and found
that even if Rocky Mountain were an appropriate community of refer-
ence, it would fail to qualify as a dependent Indian community." The
dispositive factors included: private ownership of most of the land, a lack
of cohesiveness manifested by an absence of government and economic
activity, removal of a majority of the restricted allotments, and the fact
that eligibility for federal benefits arose from the inhabitants' status as
Cherokee Indians, not from the status of the Rocky Mountain area as an
established, protected, or serviced community. While no single factor
was determinative, the undercurrent of this stage of the court's analysis
suggests that where federal benefits are given to individual Indians be-
cause of their status as Indians, as opposed to their status as members of
an Indian community, no dependent Indian community exists and the
federal government lacks jurisdiction.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 772.
62. United States v. Adair, 913 F. Supp. 1503, 1515-16 (E.D. Okla. 1995).
63. Adair, 111 F.3d at 775.
64. Id. at 774.
65. Id. at 775.
66. Id.




In Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Narragansett Elec. Co.," the First
Circuit addressed the question of whether the Narragansett Tribe had
authority to construct a housing complex without first obtaining various
permits and approval from the state of Rhode Island The tribe had pur-
chased land for the project from a private developer and based jurisdic-
tion on dependent community status." The Department of Housing and
Urban Development had provided financing for the purchase and con-
struction of the project, and had agreed to subsidize rents.'
In a case of first impression, the First Circuit focused its analysis on
four factors: the relationship of the inhabitants of the area to Indian tribes
and the federal government, the cohesiveness of the community, who
holds title and exercises authority over the area, and whether the lands
have been set apart by the federal government for the use, occupancy,
and protection of dependent Indian peoples."2 The court commented that
"[rloughly speaking, the second and third factors weigh whether there is,
in fact, an Indian community, and the first and fourth whether it is a de-
pendent one." Under the facts presented, the court held that while the
second and third factors indicated the existence of a community of Indi-
ans, the first and fourth demonstrated that it was not a dependent one.
Ultimately, the court determined that federal involvement in the project
was insufficient to establish that the site was "set apart" for the benefit of
a dependent Indian community. Accordingly, the Narragansett had to
comply with state regulations in building the housing project.
The Ninth Circuit recently considered the question of dependent
Indian community status in Alaska ex rel Yukon Flats School District v.
Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government.' In that case, the Native
Village of Venetie Tribal Government had attempted to impose a Busi-
ness Activities Tax on a construction company hired by the state of
Alaska to build a new school in the village. 8 The state, as the party ulti-
mately responsible for paying any impost, claimed that Venetie lacked
jurisdiction to impose the tax. 9 Venetie based jurisdiction on its depend-
68. 89 F.3d 908 (1 st Cir. 1996).
69. Narragansett, 89 F.3d at 910-I1.
70. Id. at 911. The land for the housing site was located adjacent to other tribal lands. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 916-21.
73. Id. at 917.
74. Id. at 921.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 922.
77. 101 F.3d 1286 (9th Cir. 1996) (Venetie 1), rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 948 (1998) (Venetie I1).
78. Venetie 1, 101 F.3d at 1289.
79. Id. at 1290.
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ent Indian community status.' The district court determined that Con-
gress had extinguished dependent Indian community status in Alaska
when it passed the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA)'
The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that ANCSA had not extin-
guished dependent Indian community status in Alaska, and that Venetie
qualified as a dependent Indian community. 82 Briefly, Congress enacted
ANCSA to pave the way for the construction of the trans-Alaska oil
pipeline." The Act extinguished all aboriginal rights and claims in ex-
change for cash payments and the creation of Native corporations which
have an extraordinary degree of control over Native institutions." The
Ninth Circuit held that ANCSA did not extinguish dependent Indian
community status in Alaska because in passing the Act, Congress was
"fulfilling, not abandoning, its trust responsibilities."
Venetie had taken advantage of a provision in ANCSA allowing
village corporations to opt out of the Act and to receive title in fee simple
to their former reservation lands in lieu of land or monetary distributions
from the regional corporation.' This fact played a critical role in the
Ninth Circuit's analysis. The court held that a dependent Indian commu-
nity required a general showing of federal set aside and federal superin-
tendence." To inform its decision, the court examined six factors includ-
ing: the nature of the area, the relationship of the area inhabitants to In-
dian tribes and the federal government, the established practice of gov-
ernment agencies toward that area, the degree of federal ownership of
and control over the area, the degree of cohesiveness of the area inhabi-
tants, and the extent to which the area was set aside for the use, occu-
pancy, and protection of dependent Indian peoples."
In its analysis, the court noted that the area was reasonably well
defined, there existed a high degree of cohesiveness among the inhabi-
tants, the inhabitants maintained significant relationships with numerous
federal agencies, and the federal government exhibited continued in-
volvement through grants for the construction of an airport, housing
80. Alaska ex rel Yukon Flats Sch. Dist. v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 856 F.2d
1384, 1390 (9th Cir. 1988).
81. Venetie 1, 101 F.3d at 1290 (quoting the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1601-1629 (1994)).
82. Id. at 1294-1300.
83. See COHEN, supra note 1, at 739-43.
84. See id.
85. Venetie I, 101 F.3d at 1299.
86. Id. at 1289-90 (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 1618(b)). Venetie represents the merger of two Native
villages whose inhabitants descend from the Neets'aii Gwich'in, a group of Native Alaskans that has
historically occupied the area of land in question. Id. at 1289.
87. id. at 1294.
88. Id. This test is a combination of case law from the Eighth and Tenth Circuits. See United
States v. South Dakota, 665 F.2d. 837, 839 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v. Martine, 442 F.2d 1022,
1023 (10th Cir. 1971).
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units, and wastewater systems.89 Most importantly, the court found that
the reunification of Venetie with its former reservation land through
ANCSA, a congressionally enacted statutory mechanism, demonstrated
that the land had been "set aside for the use occupancy and protection of
Alaska Natives."
The Supreme Court reversed, and in a unanimous decision held that
dependent Indian community "refers to a limited category of Indian lands
that are neither reservations nor allotments, and that satisfy two require-
ments-first, they must have been set aside by the Federal Government
for the use of the Indians as Indian land; second, they must be under fed-
eral superintendence."9' The Court concluded that Venetie's ANCSA
lands did not meet either requirement.' In direct contrast to the Ninth
Circuit's view, the Court found that "ANCSA, far from designating
Alaskan lands for Indian use, revoked all existing reservations in Alaska
[that had been] 'set aside by legislation or by Executive or Secretarial
Order for Native use."'"' The Court also found that one of ANCSA's
central purposes, to effect Native self-determination through outright
land transfers, was contrary to any notion of federal control and superin-
tendence." The Court, relying in part on Sandoval and McGowan," held
that superintendence required active federal control of the land in ques-
tion such that the federal government was serving as guardian for the
Indians.' The federal government's involvement in the health, education
and welfare of the Tribe failed "to support a finding of federal superin-
tendence." 7
D. Analysis
The Supreme Court's decision in Venetie H is certain to have con-
siderable effect on the issue of dependent community status. The Court,
in creating the new standard, disregarded any notion of "community," an
issue that had garnered significant circuit court attention for many years.
All of the circuit tests discussed above contained some factor that ad-
dressed the issue of community. The Tenth Circuit was especially con-
cerned with the issue, creating and applying the threshold "community of
reference" test. In the future, none of these "community" factors will
have any significance in light of the narrow focus of the Supreme Court's
new test.
89. Venetie 1, 101 F.3d at 1300-01.
90. Id. at 1302.
91. Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 118 S. Ct. 948,953 (1998) (Venetie If).
92. Venetie 11, 118 S. Ct. at 955.
93. Id. (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 1618(a) (1994)) (emphasis by Justice Thomas).
94. Id. at 956.
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It appears that the Supreme Court has significantly raised the bar for
those claiming dependent community status. Not only is a specific set
aside required, but basic federal aid such as housing supplements and
health and education benefits will no longer amount to dependency. De-
pendency must rise to a level of superintendence equal to active control
by the federal government. Given the federal government's promotion of
tribal self-determination by providing finances and then granting tribes
the authority to administer the various social programs on their own, the
degree of federal control, and therefore, the likelihood of dependent
status, is certain to decline. The diminishing role of the federal govern-
ment that flows from this policy justifies a corresponding decrease in
federal criminal jurisdiction. But dependent community status is also tied
to questions of civil jurisdiction, and it is bittersweet irony for tribal
authorities that as they gain control over the management of social pro-
grams they become less dependent and their jurisdictional authority de-
creases.
II. TRIBAL CIVIL JURISDICTION AND THE EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE
A. Background
In contrast to criminal jurisdiction, civil jurisdiction in Indian coun-
try is generally not governed by federal statutes and its contours are less
precise." Tribal courts generally have exclusive jurisdiction over suits
brought against tribal members for any claim arising in Indian country."
Where the defendant is not a tribal member, jurisdiction often turns on
whether the incident took place on tribal land. A leading case outlining
the current extent of tribal civil jurisdiction is Montana v. United
States."m Montana addressed the issue of whether the Crow Tribe could
prohibit non-Indian fishing and hunting on land within the reservation
but owned in fee by nonmembers of the Tribe.'' The Supreme Court held
that while the Crow could prohibit nonmembers from hunting and fishing
on land belonging to the Tribe or held by the United States in trust for
the Tribe, it could not prohibit such activity on land held in fee by non-
members."m The Court ruled that the exercise of tribal power beyond
what is necessary to protect tribal self-government was inconsistent with
the dependent status of the tribes and could not survive without express
98. See Pommersheim, supra note 20, at 334. One source notes:
The development of principles governing civil jurisdiction in Indian country has been
markedly different from the development of rules dealing with criminal jurisdiction.
Contrary to the rule in criminal matters, Indian Tribes retain civil regulatory and judicial
jurisdiction over non-Indians. The extent of tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians,
however, is not fully determined.
COHEN, supra note 1, at 253.
99. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 222-23 (1959); COHEN, supra note l, at 342.
100. 450U.S.544(1981).




congressional delegation." The Court relied on its earlier decision in
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,'" which flatly prohibited criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians.' ' The Court reasoned that the principles on
which Oliphant relied "support the general proposition that the inherent
sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of the
nonmembers of the tribe."' ' The Court qualified this broad assertion by
noting:
To be sure, Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise
some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reserva-
tions, even on non-Indian fee lands. A tribe may regulate, through
taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who
enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through
commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements. A tribe
may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the
conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that
conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity,
the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.'07
Montana's significance is its initial presumption that, absent express
congressional delegation, tribes do not have legislative or regulatory ju-
risdiction over non-Indians on fee lands within the reservation. "0 This
presumption can only be overcome where nonmembers enter into con-
sensual relationships with tribal members,'"' or where nonmember con-
duct threatens the political integrity, economic security, or health or wel-
fare of the tribe.'
While the factual situation in Montana concerned the extent of leg-
islative jurisdiction over nonmembers, the Supreme Court recently clari-
fied any misconceptions that Montana did not apply to similar questions
of adjudicatory jurisdiction as well. In Strate v. A-i Contractors,"' the
Court stated unequivocally that as to nonmembers, "a tribe's adjudicative
jurisdiction does not exceed its legislative jurisdiction.'"' 2 In its decision,
the Court affirmed a finding that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction over
a case involving an auto accident between two non-Indians that occurred
on a portion of public highway maintained by the state of North Dakota
under a federally granted right of way over Indian reservation land."3 The
Court specifically rejected the petitioner's argument that tribal court ju-
risdiction over the case rested exclusively on the concept of inherent
103. Id. at 564.
104. 435 U.S. 191 (1977).
105. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 194-95.
106. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565.
107. Id. at 565-66.
108. See Pommersheim, supra note 20, at 345.
109. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565 (citing Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959)).
110. Id. at 566 (citations omitted).
Ill. 117S. Ct. 1404,1413(1997).
112. Strate, 117 S. Ct. at 1413 (citations omitted).
113. Id. at 1408-09.
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sovereignty."" The Court concluded that unless one of the Montana ex-
ceptions were present, the tribal court was without jurisdiction."'
Significantly, Strate expressed no view on the proper forum for
claims against non-Indians arising on tribal lands in Indian country, '1 6 and
the Supreme Court has thus far refrained from establishing definitive
boundaries for tribal jurisdiction over such claims."" Instead, in an at-
tempt to effectuate the congressional policy of self-determination, the
Court established the tribal court exhaustion doctrine."' The exhaustion
doctrine encourages federal courts to refrain from exercising federal
question and diversity jurisdiction in favor of giving tribal courts the first
opportunity to evaluate challenges to their authority. "9
In National Farmers Union Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indi-
ans,'" the Supreme Court held that a determination of tribal civil juris-
diction required an examination of the extent to which tribal sovereignty
had been altered, divested, or diminished, as well as a detailed study of
relevant statutes, executive branch policy, and administrative or judicial
decisions.'2 ' Furthermore, the Court held that such an "examination
should be conducted in the first instance in the Tribal Court itself." ' The
Court noted, however, that application of the exhaustion doctrine was not
required where assertions of tribal jurisdiction were conducted in bad
faith, where the action was patently violative of express jurisdictional
prohibitions, or where exhaustion was futile because of the lack of ade-
quate opportunity to challenge jurisdiction."
Two years after National Farmers, the Supreme Court reinforced
and expanded the exhaustion doctrine to apply to cases involving federal
diversity jurisdiction.'24 In Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante,'2 the
Court concluded that tribal authority over the activities of non-Indians on
114. ld. at 1414.
115. ld. at 1410-13.
116. Id. at 1408.
117. See COHEN, supra note 1, at 255-56.
118. See Laurie Reynolds, Exhaustion of Tribal Remedies: Extolling Tribal Sovereignty While
Expanding Federal Jurisdiction, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1089, 1090-92 (1995). The exhaustion also served
to expand federal review of tribal court decisions. Id. at 1092.
119. National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856 (1985). For
a discussion of the abstention doctrine as it functions in state court proceedings see John Harte,
Validity of a State Court's Exercise of Concurrent Jurisdiction Over Civil Actions Arising In Indian
Country: Application of the Indian Abstention Doctrine in State Court, 21 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 63
(1997).
120. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
121. National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 855-56 (citations omitted). The Court refused to extend its
holding in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe to issues of civil jurisdiction. Id. at 855 (citing
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191,212 (1977)).
122. Id. at 856.
123. Id. at 856 n.21 (quoting Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 338 (1977)).
124. Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 16 (1987).
125. 480 U.S. 9(1987).
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reservation lands was an important part of sovereignty and that civil ju-
risdiction would presumptively rest in the tribal courts unless affirma-
tively limited by a specific treaty provision or federal statute.'26 It is im-
portant to note that a federal court decision requiring exhaustion of tribal
remedies does not remove, but merely postpones the exercise of federal
question or diversity jurisdiction until the tribal court has had an oppor-
tunity to hear the case."'
B. Kerr-McGee Corporation v. Farley"
1. Facts
For more than twenty years, the Kerr-McGee corporation milled
uranium on the Navajo Reservation under a lease from the Tribe.'" In
1995, members of the Navajo Tribe filed a complaint in Navajo Tribal
Court against Kerr-McGee alleging that the corporation's uranium mill
had "released vast quantities of radioactive and toxic materials, causing
them injuries.""'n The defendants brought suit in federal district court
seeking declaratory judgment and a preliminary injunction.'3 ' They ar-
gued that the tribal court had no jurisdiction over nuclear tort claims un-
der the Price-Anderson Act (PAA).'" In passing the Price-Anderson Act
(PAA) and subsequent amendments, Congress created expansive federal
jurisdiction over claims arising out of nuclear accidents by providing
both original jurisdiction in federal district courts and an automatic right
of removal from any action brought in state court.'33 The Act was silent,
however, regarding claims arising out of nuclear incidents on tribal land.
The district court, applying the tribal exhaustion rule, denied the injunc-
tion and stayed further action in federal court until the tribal court ruled
on its jurisdiction."'
126. Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 18.
127. See Reynolds, supra note 118, at 1101-04.
128. 115 F.3d 1498 (10th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 880(1998).




133. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2) (1994). The pertinent parts provide:
With respect to any public liability action arising out of or resulting from a nuclear inci-
dent, the United States district court in the district where the nuclear incident takes place.
. . shall have original jurisdiction without regard to the citizenship of any party of the
amount in controversy. Upon motion of the defendant or of the Commission or the Sec-
retary, as appropriate, any such action pending in any State court... shall be removed..
. to the United States district court having venue under this subsection.
Id.
134. Kerr-McGee, 115 F.3d at 1500.
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2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit took the case on interlocutory appeal and af-
firmed the lower court decision.'" Kerr-McGee argued that the language
of the PAA granted exclusive federal jurisdiction over the claim, thereby
implicating one of the exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine outlined in
National Farmers.' Specifically, Kerr-McGee contended that an action
in tribal court would be patently violative of the express jurisdictional
prohibitions of the PAA, making tribal exhaustion inappropriate." ' The
Tenth Circuit concluded that the PAA had not expressly prohibited the
exercise of tribal jurisdiction.'38 Because the statute did not provide for
removal from tribal court as it did from state court, the Tenth Circuit
concluded that a federal court could not speculate as to Congress's intent
regarding actions brought in tribal courts. 9
Kerr-McGee further argued that even without an express jurisdic-
tional prohibition, Navajo adjudicatory power over such claims went
beyond what was necessary to protect tribal self-government and, there-
fore, could not survive without express congressional delegation.'" The
court responded that the proper inference to be drawn from congressional
silence required reconciling "two arguably divergent strands of case
law," but that Navajo authority over the nuclear incident was not patently
violative of an express jurisdictional prohibition.' The two arguably
different strands of case law to which the court referred were Iowa Mu-
tual" 2-- congressional silence gives rise to a presumption of tribal juris-
diction, and Montana"3--without express congressional delegation, ju-
risdiction does not exist beyond what is necessary to protect the Tribe.'"
Because Kerr-McGee clearly conducted its operations on Navajo land,
however, the Tribe's jurisdiction was not open to challenge under Mon-
tana.' Ultimately, the court applied the exhaustion doctrine because the
PAA had not specifically divested tribal courts of jurisdiction over nu-
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1502; see also National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S.
845, 857 n.21 (1985).
137. Kerr-McGee, 115 F.3d at 1502; see also National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 857 n.2 I.
138. Kerr-McGee, 115 F.3d at 1505.
139. Id. ("Simply put, 'exclusive [federal] jurisdiction' is not conferred unless conferred ex-
plicitly.").
140. Id. at 1505-06. Kerr-McGee based this argument on the Supreme Court's holding in
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981).
141. Kerr-McGee, 115 F.3d at 1506-07.
142. Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 544, 564 (1987).
143. Montana, 450 U.S. at 564.
144. Kerr-McGee, 115 F.3d at 1505-06.
145. The court noted as much by finding the Supreme Court's decision in Strate to be inappo-
site: "Kerr-McGee's alleged torts did not occur on tribal lands over which the tribe [had] ceded
authority and control .... Id. at 1507 n.4.
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clear incidents and, therefore, had not created an express jurisdictional
prohibition."
The court also considered the comity concerns behind the exhaus-
tion doctrine and concluded that the congressional commitment to Indian
self-government required that federal courts allow tribal courts to adjudi-
cate allegations of mass toxic tort injuries occurring within their jurisdic-
tion."7 This was especially true in this case, where the tribal nexus was so
strong; the mill was located on the reservation and the alleged victims
were all tribal members."'
C. Other Circuits
While none of the other circuits surveyed faced precisely the same
issue presented in Kerr-McGee, the Ninth Circuit applied the exhaustion
doctrine in Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Red Wolf. 9 Red Wolf
involved a personal injury claim brought by the heirs of two members of
the Crow Tribe who were killed when a train struck their car at a rail
crossing on the reservation.'" A jury verdict in tribal court resulted in a
$250 million judgment against the rail company."' The defendant sought
to enjoin execution of the judgment in federal court, arguing that it
would be futile to await further tribal court proceedings to determine the
amount of a supersedeous bond because, if enforced on the reservation,
the $250 million judgment would possibly be immune from a constitu-
tional due process challenge in federal court.' 2 The Ninth Circuit ruled
that the futility exception of National Farmers spoke to questions of ju-
risdiction only, and that the railroad had not exhausted its tribal reme-
dies. 3 The Supreme Court, however, pursuant to its decision in Strate,
vacated the Ninth Circuit's Red Wolf decision.' The Ninth Circuit ap-
parently failed to recognize the application of Montana to the issue of
adjudicatory jurisdiction in Red Wolf
146. Id. at 1507.
147. Id. at 1508.
148. Id.
149. 106 F.3d 868, 871 (9th Cir. 1997), vacated, 118 S. Ct. 37 (1997).
150. Red Wolf, 106 F.3d at 869.
151. Id. The dissenting judge had "serious doubts" regarding the fairness of the tribal court
judgment and noted that the "the trial appear[ed] to have been in the 'wave the bloody shirt' genre."
Id. at 872 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 870. Because Indian tribes are neither states nor part of the federal government, they
are not limited by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth AmendmenL See Talton v. Mayes, 163
U.S. 376, 384-85 (1896). Federal courts do possess the power to deny enforcement of foreign judg-
ments in the United States where the defendant was not accorded sufficient due process. See Red
Wolf, 106 F.3d at 871 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
153. Red Wolf, 106 F.3d at 871.
154. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Red Wolf, 118 S. Ct. 37 (1997).
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D. Analysis
In Strate, the Supreme Court established a bright line rule essen-
tially removing tribal jurisdiction over any non-Indian defendant for ac-
tions occurring on fee lands within the reservation."' Under this rule, the
exhaustion doctrine was inapplicable to the facts of Red Wolf. The Crow
were simply without jurisdiction to hear the case because the defendant
was non-Indian and the incident did not take place on tribal land within
the reservation." Kerr-McGee involved different facts. Not only did the
incident take place on tribal lands, the defendant was also actively and
willingly engaged in activity with the Tribe. 7 Under these circum-
stances, employment of the exhaustion doctrine was appropriate.'! 8
If the policy of self-determination retains any significance, tribes
must be permitted to exercise judicial authority over nonmembers wish-
ing to enjoy the benefits of tribal resources. By requiring defendants to
exhaust their tribal remedies, federal courts will promote "advances in
the responsibilities and competence of the Indian courts." 9 The Strate
decision may have clarified and streamlined the judicial process regard-
ing incidents involving nonmembers on fee lands within the reservation,
but it did so at the expense of tribal authority. Removing tribal jurisdic-
tion over an entire category of circumstances undermines the policy of
self-determination by decreasing the ability of the federal courts to apply
the exhaustion doctrine.
155. Strate v. A- I Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404, 1413 (1997).
156. Strate, 117 S. CL at 1406.
157. Kerr-McGee leased the land from the Indians for its mill site from the tribe. Kerr-McGee
Corp. v. Farley, 115 F.3d 1498, 1500 (1997).
158. But see James W. Kuntz, Nuclear Incidents on Indian Reservations: Who's Jurisdiction?
Tribal Court Exhaustion v. The Price-Anderson Act, 21 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 103, 126 (1997) ("As a
result of complete federal preemption in the area of nuclear safety, there is an express jurisdictional
prohibition against Price-Anderson actions in any court but the United States federal district court..
• or in state court with an absolute right of removal .... "). Kuntz recommends that tribes refuse
jurisdiction over Price-Anderson claims because of the complexities of both nuclear tort litigation
and intra-tribal jurisdiction. Id. at 128.
159. See Michael Taylor, Modern Practice in the Indian Courts, 10 PUGET SOUND L. REV. 231,
273 (1987). Others do not look favorably on the exhaustion doctrine. See generally Robert N.
Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest: A Vision Quest for a Decolonized Federal Indian Law,
46 ARK. L. REV. 77, 150 (1993) (noting that review of "tribal court decisions reflects the ultimate
colonial distrust of leaving the final resolution to. .. tribal governance"); Reynolds, supra note 118,
at 1156 (concluding that the exhaustion doctrine has had the negative effect of allowing expansive
relitigation on the merits in federal court and recommending instead a policy of selective review of
tribal court decisions by way of writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court).
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III. TREATING TRIBES AS STATES UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT
A. Background
In 1972, Congress enacted the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act"w with the goal of restoring and maintaining the integrity of the na-
tion's waters. ' In furtherance of this goal, Congress amended the Act in
1977 by passing the Clean Water Act (CWA). '62 The CWA envisioned a
partnership between the states and the federal government with the states
as primary actors, free to set water quality standards in order to encour-
age the development of new technologies."3 The Act precludes states
from adopting water quality standards that are less stringent than federal
standards, but recognizes a state's right to adopt standards that are more
stringent than those promulgated by the EPA.' " Utilizing a cooperative
federalism approach, the EPA issues National Pollution Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) permits to waste treatment facilities based
on discharge limits that meet state water quality standards.'"
The EPA interprets the Act to allow it to condition the issuance of a
discharge permit in one state on compliance with the water quality stan-
dards of another, downstream state.'" Acting in this the manner, the EPA
gives the downstream state's standards extraterritorial effect. In Arkansas
v. Oklahoma, 7 the Supreme Court upheld this interpretation as a reason-
able exercise of statutory discretion and a well-tailored means of
achieving the Act's goal of improving water quality standards.'"
Despite its broad provisions, the CWA was initially silent on
whether the phrase "the Nation's waters" included waters on Indian
lands.9 This silence created a jurisdictional gap because states generally
do not have regulatory authority over Indian lands.7 In 1987, Congress
acted to fill this void by amending the Act to include a provision giving
the EPA authority to treat Indian tribes as states, provided the tribes meet
160. Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 2, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-
1376 (1994)).
161. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994) ("The objective of this chapter is to restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters.").
162. Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, §1, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 33 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C. & 43 U.S.C.).
163. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b).
164. Id. § 1370.
165. Id. § 1342 (1994). The states may also issue such permits upon application and approval
from EPA. Id.
166. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(d) (1997); see also Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 105 (1992).
167. 503 U.S. 91 (1992).
168. Arkansas, 503 U.S. at 104-07.
169. See James M. Grijalva, Tribal Government Regulation of Non-Indian Polluters of Reser-
vation Waters, 71 N.D. L. REV. 433 (1995).
170. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 221-22 (1987). In Cabazon,
the Court looked to traditional notions of tribal sovereignty and the congressional goal of Indian self-
government and ruled that California could not regulate gaming on Indian land. Id. at 216-22.
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certain criteria. 7 ' Pursuant to its new authority, the EPA promulgated
rules requiring interested tribes to submit an application containing the
following: a statement that the Secretary of the Interior recognizes the
tribe, a statement documenting that the current tribal governing body
carries out substantial governmental duties and powers over a defined
area, a description of the tribe's authority to regulate water quality, and a
description of the tribe's ability to administer a Water Quality Standards
program.'72 Upon receiving an application, the EPA provides notice to
"all appropriate governmental entities" and allows thirty days for com-
ment regarding the tribe's assertion of authority.'73 If the tribe satisfies the
listed requirements to the satisfaction of the EPA, the tribe may admin-
ister a Water Quality Standards program.' Once authorized, the tribe,
like a state, is free to set its own standards either by following EPA rec-
ommendations or by using other scientifically supported criteria.'" The
tribe must provide notice and the opportunity of a public hearing before
submitting its proposed water quality standards to the EPA for final ap-
proval.7 6
B. City of Albuquerque v. Browner'
7
1. Facts
The Rio Grande River flows from north to south through the state of
New Mexico and then turns southeast to form the border between the
United States and Mexico.78 Albuquerque's water treatment facility dis-
charges into the river about five miles upstream from the Isleta Pueblo
171. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (1994). The statute reads:
The Administrator is authorized to treat an Indian tribe as a State for the purposes of
subchapter H of this chapter and sections 1254, 1256, 1313, 1315, 1318, 1319, 1324,
1329, 1341, 1342, and 1344 of this title to the degree necessary to carry out the objec-
tions of this section, but only if-
(1) The Indian tribe has a governing body carrying out substantial governmental du-
ties and powers;
(2) the functions to be exercised by the Indian tribe pertain to the management and
protection of water resources which are held by an Indian tribe, held by the United States
in trust for Indians, held by a member of an Indian tribe if such propeity interest is sub-
ject to a trust restriction on alienation, or otherwise within the borders of an Indian reser-
vation; and
(3) the Indian tribe is reasonably expected to be capable, in the Administrator's
judgment, of carrying out the functions to be exercised in a manner consistent with the
terms and purposes of this chapter and of all applicable regulations.
Id. Tribes have been given state status in other areas as well. See, e.g., Safe Drinking Water Act, 42
U.S.C. § 300j-I 1 (1994); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7474(c) (1994).
172. 40 C.F.R. § 131.8(b)(l)-(4) (1997).
173. 40 C.F.R. § 131.8(c).
174. Id.
175. 48Fed. Reg. 51,400,51,411 (1983).
176. 40 C.F.R. § 131.10(e).
177. 97 F.3d 415 (1Oth Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 410 (1997).
178. Browner, 97 F.3d at 419.
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boundary.'" In 1992, the Isleta Pueblo became the first Tribe to be recog-
nized as a state for the purposes of the CWA. ° Subsequently, Isleta
Pueblo adopted and the EPA approved water quality standards signifi-
cantly more stringent than those of either the federal government or the
state of New Mexico.'81 To comply with the Isleta Pueblo's standards, the
city of Albuquerque would have needed to spend $250 million for im-
provements to its water treatment facility.' 2 The city brought suit against
the EPA challenging the stricter standards.' The district court granted
summary judgment to the EPA on all issues and the city appealed. ,'
Prior to the appeal, the city, the EPA, the state of New Mexico, and
the Isleta Pueblo agreed to a four year NPDES permit for Albuquerque.'
On appeal, the city argued that the settlement rendered the issue moot."M
The Tenth Circuit ruled that granting the permit did not render the issue
moot because the Isleta Pueblo water quality standards and the EPA's
regulations were still in force, and the agreement concerned only the
issuance of the permit.' More importantly, Albuquerque argued that the
CWA forbade the tribes from establishing water quality standards more
stringent than those of the federal government, and forbade the EPA
from enforcing tribal standards beyond reservation boundaries."
2. Decision
The city based the first part of its argument on the fact that Con-
gress, in granting the EPA authority to treat tribes as states in section
1377, made no reference to section 1370, which allows states to set more
stringent standards.' 9 The Tenth Circuit applied a "Chevron analysis"'"
179. Id.
180. Mark A. Bilut, Albuquerque v. Browner, Native American Tribal Authority Under the
Clean Water Act: Raging Like a River Out of Control, 45 SYRACUSE L. REV. 887, 894 n.54 (1994)
(quoting a letter from B.J. Wynne, Regional Administrator, EPA, to Alex Lucero, Governor, Pueblo
of Isleta (Oct. 13, 1992)); see also City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 865 F. Supp. 733, 736 (D.N.M.
1993).
181. Browner, 865 F. Supp. at 736.
182. See Bilut, supra note 180, at 896.
183. Browner, 97 F.3d at 419.
184. Id. at 418.
185. Id. at 419.
186. Id. at 420.
187. Id. at 420-21. The court also pointed out its concern that the city merely wanted "to ex-
punge the district court's adverse decision, giving the City the option to relitigate [the] action at
some later date." Id. at 421.
188. Id. at 421.
189. Id. at 423.
190. See Chevron, USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984). Chevron requires a two step approach to judicial review of an agency's construction of a
statute. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. The court first determines whether congressional intent is am-
biguous. Id. at 843. If not, the agency must follow the clear intent of Congress. Id. if the statute is
ambiguous, the court moves to the second step and determines whether the agency's interpretation is
based on a "permissible construction of the statue." Id. At this stage, agency interpretation is entitled
to considerable deference from the court. Id. at 844.
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and held the EPA's construction of the statute to be reasonable.' 9' Be-
cause Congress designed the CWA to give states a primary role in elimi-
nating pollution from the nation's waterways, Congress's intent in ex-
cluding section 1370 from section 1377 was "unclear and ambiguous."'"
In the second step of its analysis, the court held that the EPA's interpre-
tation of section 1370 as a "savings clause that merely recognizes powers
already held by the states" was permissible. Under the EPA's permissible
interpretation, "Congress' failure to incorporate § 1370 into § 1377 [did]
not prevent Indian tribes from exercising their inherent sovereign power
to impose standards or limits that are more stringent than those imposed
by the federal government.'
93
The city based the second part of its argument on the fact that sec-
tion 1377 did not expressly permit Indian tribes to enforce their standards
on upstream dischargers outside of tribal boundaries.' The court dis-
missed this argument, reasoning that it is the EPA, and not the tribes, that
exercises authority in issuing NPDES permits in compliance with down-
stream state and tribal water quality standards.'95 As noted above, the
Supreme Court has ruled that the EPA has authority to impose a down-
stream state's standards on upstream dischargers.'"
Albuquerque also challenged the EPA on procedural grounds,
claiming that the EPA failed to meet the notice and comment require-
ments prior to approving the standards,'97 and that the EPA's decision
was arbitrary and capricious because it was unsupported by the record.'"
The court ruled that the notice and comment period provided by the
Tribe before submitting the standards to the EPA was sufficient, and that
Congress did not intend that the EPA conduct an additional notice and
comment period. '" In response to the city's argument that the EPA acted
arbitrarily in adopting standards that were unattainable and not supported
by the record, the Tenth Circuit noted that the EPA's role was limited to
a determination of whether the standards were stringent enough to com-
191. Browner, 97 F.3d at 422.
192. Id. at 423. The Tenth Circuit also noted that it had been criticized by the Supreme Court
for failing to afford the EPA the appropriate level of deference in Arkansas v. Oklahoma. Id. (citing
Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992)).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 421.
195. Id. at 424. The court pointed out that the CWA is a comprehensive regulatory scheme and
must be read as such. Id. at 423. Thus, "[wihile § 1377 incorporates § 1342, § 1342 incorporates §
1311 and thereby provides the EPA the authority to issue NPDES permits to upstream point source
dischargers which are in compliance with the downstream state's and tribe's water quality stan-
dards." Id. at 424 n. 13.
196. See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
197. Browner, 97 F.3d at 424; see 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994).
198. Browner, 97 F.3d at 426.
199. Id. at 424-25.
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ply with the federally recommended standards." ° The EPA may approve
of more stringent standards without reviewing the scientific support and
has the discretion to determine whether such standards are attainable.'
In essence, the court ruled that the policy of Congress and the EPA to
afford states and tribes the ability to enforce more stringent standards
was beyond judicial review. n
In promulgating its water quality standards, the Tribe designated its
use of the Rio Grande as "Primary Contact Ceremonial Use. ' '" The
city's last challenge was that the EPA's approval of the ceremonial use
designation offended the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment0 '
by promoting the Pueblo's religion at the city's expense.' The court
ruled that the "EPA's purpose in approving the designated use [was]
unrelated to Isleta Pueblo's religious reason for establishing it," and that
the designation did not "invalidate the EPA's overall secular goal." ' The
EPA's decision advanced the goals of the CWA and provided only an
incidental benefit to the Tribe's religion.'
C. Other Circuits
In Montana v. EPA,' the state of Montana and individual non-
Indians challenged the EPA's grant of state status to the Confederated
Salish and Kootenai Tribes.' The complaints alleged that the Tribes did
not have inherent jurisdiction over water quality, and that granting such
authority would improperly subject Montana to the civil regulatory
power of the Tribe."' The new tribal standards would apply to several
towns and counties within the reservation,2 ' the population of which is
200. Id. at 426. The Isleta Pueblo arsenic standard, for example, was 1000 times more stringent
than the federal Safe Drinking Water Standard. City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 865 F. Supp 733,
742 (D.N.M. 1993). The district court was troubled by the fact that the arsenic standard was not
measurable by current laboratory equipment and that "arsenic occur(ed] naturally in Albuquerque's
groundwater at relatively high levels and [was] not discharged to the water by industrial polluters."
Browner, 865 F. Supp. at 747. EPA had not even concluded that enforcing the Pueblo's standards
would actually improve downstream water quality. Id.
201. Browner, 97 F.3d at 426.
202. Id. ("It is not our role ... to decide which policy choice is the better one, for it is clear that
Congress has entrusted such decisions to the [EPA].").
203. Id. at 428.
204. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of relig-
ion ... ").
205. See Browner, 97 F.3d at 428. The city also challenged the standards for vagueness.
Browner, 97 F.3d at 429. The court ruled that the Pueblo's standards were not vague because the
NPDES permit system gave sufficient notice of the specific enforceable standards. Id.
206. Browner, 97 F.3d at 428.
207. Id.
208. 941 F. Supp. 945 (D. Mont. 1996).
209. Montana, 941 F. Supp. at 947.
210. Id. at 947-48. Because of the new standards, the claimants were required to seek discharge
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less than one quarter Indian."2 Citing the statutory language and referring
to common sense, the district court noted that Congress likely intended to
grant tribes the authority to set water quality standards for the entire res-
ervation area, including areas where stream segments traverse or bound
non-Indian land.13
The district court noted that in Brendale v. Confederated Tribes &
Bands of the Yakima Nation,""4 Justice White cited section 1377 as an
example of an "explicit delegation of congressional authority to Indian
tribes.""3 The EPA had taken a more cautious view, deciding that Con-
gress had made no such express delegation, and required the tribes to
prove jurisdiction on a case by case basis."6 The EPA based its operating
rule on United States v. Montana,"' where the Supreme Court held that
tribes may retain inherent jurisdiction over the activities of non-Indians
on fee lands within the reservation where the activities threaten or have
"some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or
the health or welfare of the tribe."2 8 Under EPA guidelines, once a tribe
has made an adequate showing of tribal jurisdiction over fee lands, it is
up to the competing governmental entity to demonstrate the Tribe's lack
of jurisdiction."9 In this case, the EPA determined that pollution of sur-
face waters traversing or appurtenant to nonmember land would have a
serious and substantial impact on the tribe's health and welfare.' ° The
court found the EPA's determination consistent with the record and not
contrary to law."'
D. Analysis
Under current decisions, the future bodes well for tribes seeking to
gain state status under the Clean Water Act.' The EPA guidelines have
212. See Daniel I.S.J. Rey-Bear, The Flathead Water Quality Standards Dispute: Legal Bases
for Tribal Regulatory Authority Over Non-Indian Reservation Lands, 20 AMER. INDIAN L. REV. 151,
190 (1996) (citing the BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1990 CENSUS OF THE
POPULATION, GENERAL POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS, AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKAN NATIVE
AREAS 6 (1992)).
213. Montana, 941 F. Supp. at 951-52.
214. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
215. Montana, 941 F. Supp. at 951-52 (citing Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the
Yakima Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 428 (1989)). The district court noted that the plurality of the Brendale
Court supported the continued use of the Montana test. Id. at 957.
216. Id. at 952 (citing 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876,64,879-80 (1991)).
217. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
218. Montana, 941 F. Supp. at 952 (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66
(1981)).
219. Id. at 953 (citing 56 Fed. Reg. at 64,879).
220. Id. at 957.
221. Id. at 958.
222. Tribal jurisdiction to regulate water quality under the Clean Water Act is widely accepted.
In Rhode Island v. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 19 F.3d 685 (1st Cir. 1994), the First Circuit used the
fact that EPA recognized the Narragansett Tribe as the functional equivalent of a state under the
CWA to conclude that the tribe exercised sufficient government power to trigger the application of
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not been successfully challenged in any of the federal circuits.- Addition-
ally, despite the EPA's view that the CWA does not constitute a congres-
sional delegation of jurisdiction, the relationship between water quality
and tribal health and welfare will satisfy the Montana test in most in-
stances. Both the holdings are significant. By upholding the EPA's de-
termination of inherent jurisdiction over non-tribal members within the
reservation, the District of Montana decision represents a halt in the ero-
sion of tribal jurisdiction over the activities of non-members within the
reservation. By upholding EPA enforcement of a downstream tribe's
water quality standards on an upstream state, the Tenth Circuit decision
represents a thunderous expansion of tribal authority. All of this at the
hands of Congress and the EPA.
Some commentators have criticized the Browner decision on the
grounds that the EPA did not act reasonably in approving the Isleta
Pueblo's standards.' Under Browner, critics fear the EPA could approve
standards that required 100% pure water and upstream cities would be
required to comply." This fear is misplaced for at least two reasons.
First, section 1377(e) requires the EPA to "provide mechanisms for the
resolution of any unreasonable consequences that may arise as a result of
differing water quality standards set by states and Indian tribes located
on common bodies of water." Why the state of New Mexico did not
challenge the Pueblo's standards under this section is not known. If the
state had done so, the adopted standards may have been very different
and more accommodating to the city. Second, tribes are subject to the
same EPA regulations, and the fact that a tribe could one day find itself
beholden to another state's or tribe's standards will provide an important
reminder of the golden rule. 6
Other commentators have argued that empowering tribes to estab-
lish their own water quality standards will increase politicization and
important provisions of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. Rhode Island, 19 F.3d at 703. In another
case, the First Circuit ruled that state jurisdiction to regulate Individual Sewage Disposal Systems
located on tribal lands was preempted by federal law because the EPA had granted the Narragansett
Tribe state status, allowing the tribe to set its own standards under the CWA. See Narragansett
Indian Tribe v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 878 F. Supp. 349 (D.R.I. 1995), rev'd on other grounds, 89
F.3d 908, 921-22 (1st Cir. 1996) (concluding that the land in question was not a "dependent" com-
munity, and therefore not Indian country over which the tribe could exercise jurisdiction).
223. See Bilut, supra note 180, at 907 (arguing that EPA could control standards by application
of section 1377(e) which requires EPA to "provide a mechanism for the resolution of any unreason-
able consequences that may arise as a result of differing water quality standards .....
224. See Bilut, supra note 180, at 913.
225. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (1994). The statute requires EPA to consider the "economic impacts"
of differing standards. Id.
226. "The precept of 'do as you would be done by."' I THE NEw SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 1114 (4th ed. 1993). Evidence of this awareness is seen in a Ninth Circuit case where
the Confederated Tribes adopted standards that were virtually identical to the those set by Montana.
Montana v. EPA, 941 F. Supp. 945,947 n.l (D. Mont. 1996).
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undermine effective watershed management." The issue of effective
watershed management is beyond the scope of this survey, but traditional
Native American notions of a person's relationship to his or her envi-
ronment would likely improve any discussion. By recognizing tribal ju-
risdiction over water quality standards, Congress and the EPA have taken
a step in furtherance of two goals, maintaining the integrity of our na-
tion's waterways and promoting tribal self-determination.
CONCLUSION
The recent Tenth Circuit decisions manifest confidence in the ability
of tribal governments to regulate their own affairs and generally support
a policy of Indian self-determination. Kerr-McGee reminds non-Indians
that tribal courts have authority over non-Indian activities occurring on
tribal lands. Such authority is fundamental to any policy of self-
determination. Non-Indians wishing to engage in economic pursuits on
tribal lands should be aware of tribal customs and regulations. The tribes,
by providing fair and competent forums in which to settle disputes, will
encourage and hopefully reap the benefits of such activity. The Browner
decision also supports the policy of self-determination. The power to
adopt water quality standards and monitor improvements provides an
opportunity for balanced interaction between tribes and surrounding non-
Indian communities. In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Venetie
H, the Tenth Circuit's Adair decision will have little effect on the extent
of tribal or federal authority as it relates to dependent community status.
Delineating the boundaries of authority between the federal gov-
ernment, the states, and the Indian tribes is always controversial, but if
tribes are to be self-governing and self-sufficient they must exercise
meaningful authority over issues important to them. The Browner and
Kerr-McGee decisions recognize this precept. The Supreme Court's Ve-
netie H and Strate decisions may have simplified the process of delinea-
tion, but the aftermath of these decisions will likely yield a decrease of
tribal civil authority.
Timothy M. Reynolds
227. John S. Harbison, The Down Stream People: Treating Indian Tribes as States Under the
Clean Water Act, 71 N.D. L. REV. 473 (1995) (encouraging tribes to use the leverage they acquire
by being treated a's states to promote a watershed approach to water quality protection).
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